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DYING DECLARATIONS
By HARRY A. FRUMESS, D. U. Law School, Class 1940
HE rule which allows the admissibility in evidence of
the dying declarations of a person as related to one not a
party to the proceedings and who is present in court has
come to be recognized as an exception to the rule which excludes hearsay evidence. The general hearsay rule is to the
effect that, "Statements made to one not a party in interest by
one not a party to the proceedings and not made under oath
are inadmissible in evidence, since such statements are not
spoken under the sanction of an oath, and there is no opportunity to investigate the speaker's character and motives or to
observe his deportment on the witness stand."
The exception of dying declarations dates back as far as
the first half of the eighteenth century, a period when the hearsay rule was coming to be systematically and strictly enforced.
The ruling of Lord Mansfield in Wright v. Littler, in 1761, is
generally taken as the leading case, although the notion that a
special trust may be imposed on deathbed statements had already been long understood. An orthodox limitation was
that the declarant should have been made unavailable by death.
This is amply shown by cases and treatises up to the beginning
of the nineteenth century. In particular, there is found to be
no distinction between civil and criminal cases, or between the
various kinds of criminal cases. But at this point, the misconstrued words of a treatise-writer commenced a theory of the
rule which in the next generation obtained full sway and must
be now be taken as orthodox. The language was that of Serjeant East, in 1803, "There is a kind of evidence more peculiar
to the case of homicide, which is the declaration of the deceased, after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself and the party
by whom committed." Although this statement was set out
in a chapter on "Homicide," it was probably not intended to
refer only to homicide cases. A few nisi prius courts, however, took the language as stating a general rule, and the declaration came to be limited to cases of homicide only. Thus,
the language led to a change of practice in England, and its
influence is clearly traced in subsequent American cases. Finally, in 1860, a note of Chief Justice Redfield, in his edition of
Professor Greenleaf's treatise, gave it the widest credit and led
379
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to its general acceptance. Redfield said that the true ground
for the rule was to be found in the necessity of apprehending
murderers in homicide cases, and that only this grave necessity
overcame such objections to the hearsay rule as the lack of
cross-examination and the admission of a statement not made
under oath. This note by Redfield indicates that the principle
of admitting dying declarations because of necessity was
changed from allowing such evidence because the testimony
of the deceased was not available, to one allowing the declaration only where the court felt that some social purpose could
be served thereby. But Justice West, in Thurston v. Fritz, 91
Kan. 468, 138 P. 625, in discussing the history of the rule
admitting dying declarations, said, "It would seem that the
courts first conceived and recognized the sanction which impending death would give to the statement and that this was
rather a predecessor than an exception to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence; that after hearsay had become generally regarded as inadmissible, it was reasoned that dying declarations inherently belong in that class, but that, as a matter
of public policy or necessity, their legitimacy should be recognized in homicide cases only. The real basis of admissibility,
aside from any supposed theory of necessity, is the notion
which long ago became a rule of law, that the conscious danger
of impending death is equivalent to the sanction of an oath."
But whether the true basis for the rule is that of necessity or
the sanction given to a statement made under an apprehension
of impending death, between 1806 and 1874, all the courts
gradually adopted the rule limiting dying declarations to cases
of homicide; and the rule is in force generally throughout the
United States and England today.
Until very recently, Colorado had followed this general
restrictive rule as to the admissions of dying declarations in
cases of homicide. The only exception to the rule in Colorado
was announced in Clarke v. People, 16 Colo. 511, in which
the court allowed a dying declaration where the crime of causing an abortion was charged. In this case the court, without
discussion, allowed a statement by the decedent "in extremis"
as to the cause of her condition, without apparently realizing
that it was departing from the general rule. No other case
involving the admission in abortion cases has since arisen in
Colorado; but in other cases the court followed the orthodox
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rule. Thus in Mora v. People, 19 Colo. 255, and Brennan
v. People, 37 Colo. 256, the court held that a dying declaration is admissible only where the death of the declarant is the
subject of a charge of homicide in a public prosecution; that it
must be made when the declarant is under a sense of impending
death; and that it can relate only to circumstances preceding
the homicide. The case of Zipperian v. People, 33 Colo. 134,
also a homicide case, stressed the fact that the dying declaration
was an exception to the hearsay rule, and that the defendant
could not, therefore, object on the ground that he had had no
opportunity to cross-examine or confront the witness. The
early cases of McBride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, and Graves
v. People, 18 Colo. 170, stated that if the person expected to
recover, the declaration was inadmissible, since the reason for
the admission was that approaching death made the truth of
the statement probable. The McBride case also set forth the
restriction that the declaration cannot be made in answer to
questions put to the declarant, because a declaration must be
absolutely uninfluenced. It was cases such as these that developed certain restrictions to the rule, which were later incorporated into the statute, which we shall soon consider.
This rule, that dying declarations are limited to homicide
and abortion cases, was finally abrogated in Colorado in 1937
(Chapter 145, Session Laws of 1937). This statute reads as
follows:
"The dying declarations of a deceased person shall be admissible in
evidence in all civil and criminal trials and other proceedings before
Courts, Commissions, and other tribunals to the same extent and for
the same purposes that they might have been admissible had the deceased
survived and been sworn as a witness in the proceedings, under the following restricitoas:-To render the declarations of the deceased competent evidence, it must be satisfactorily proved:
(1) That at the time of the making of such declaration, he was
conscious of approaching death and believed there was no hope of recovery;
(2) That such declaration was voluntarily made, and not through
the persuasion of any person;
(3)
That such declaration was not made in answer to interrogatories calculated to lead the deceased to make any particular statement;
(4) That he was of sound mind at the time of making the declaration."

This statute was intended to prevent the result of a case
such as Saum v. Friberg, 82 Colo. 395, a custody case, in
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which the court refused to admit a mother's dying declaration
as to the moral character of the father of the children, the statements referring to the unhappy married life of decedent, caused
by the moral unfitness of the father. This case was severely
criticized by Wigmore, who characterized it as an example of
the lamentable state of the American law of evidence, and it is
to Colorado's credit that we are among the foremost to aid in
changing the American rule. The Colorado statute is not,
however, without precedent. Dean Wigmore, in his classic
work on Evidence, says, "There is no reason for saying the necessity exists in homicide cases and not in rape and robbery
cases or even in civil cases. The limitations are heresies of the
present century and have not even the sanction of antiquity.
They should be wholly abolished by legislation." (Wigmore,
2nd Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 1436.) The author then goes on, in the
same section, to say, "The notion that crime is more worthy
the attention of courts than a civil wrong is a traditional relic
of the days when civil justice was administered in the royal
courts as a purchased favor, and criminal prosecutions in the
king's name were zealously encouraged because of the fines
which added to the royal revenues. The sanction of a dying
declaration is efficacious whether it speaks of a murder or a
robbery or a fraudulent will; and the necessity being the same,
Elliott on Evidence says,
the admissibility is the same."
"There is no reason why dying declarations should not be
used in civil as well as criminal cases." (Elliott, Vol. 1, Sec.
351.) An Oregon statute, passed in 1909, says that "Evidence may be given on the trial of the following facts * * *
(4) The declaration or act of a dying person, made or done
under a sense of impending death, respecting the cause of his
death." (Oregon Statutes, Title 9, Sec. 226.) This statute
applies to both civil and criminal cases, since it was enacted to
amend the act then in operation, of which only the words, "in
criminal actions" were stricken. It was so construed in McCarty v. Sirianni, 285 P. 825, in 1930, an action for the death
of plaintiff's intestate resulting from injuries sustained in an
automobile collision; and the dying declarations of the decedent respecting the cause of his injuries were held admissible to
the same extent and under the same limitations as evidence of
such declarations made in a case of homicide. The court there
said, "Under Clause 4 of this section, the dying declaration of
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a deceased person is admissible in a civil action." This statute
does not abrogate the rule set out in State v. Garrand,5 Ore.
216, that a dying declaration must be made under a consciousness of impending death; and therefore, it probably contains
this requisite, which is found in the Colorado statute also.
However, this statute does not appear to go as far as the Colorado statute and would apply only to actions for wrongful
death, and the testimony must apply to the circumstances respecting the cause of the death.
A North Carolina statute, passed in 1919, says, "In cases
where the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default of another, such as would, if the injured party had
lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the
person who would have been so liable shall be liable to an action for damages. * * * In all actions brought under this
section, the dying declarations of the deceased as to the cause
of his death should be admissible in evidence in like manner
and under the same rules as dying declarations of deceased in
criminal actions for homicide are now received in evidence."
Here,
(North Carolina Code, 1935, Chap. 1, Sec. 160.)
again, the statute does not go as far as the Colorado statute
and limits the admissibility of such evidence in civil actions to
a greater extent.
A Massachusetts statute states the rule that, "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence
as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant." (Massachusetts General Laws,
Chap. 233, Sec. 65.) The statute was construed in Brady v.
Doherty, 149 N. E. 198, a Massachusetts case decided in 1925,
in which the court said, "In actions at law and suits in equity,
declarations of a deceased person formerly excluded as hearsay
are admissible under the statute. But this does not apply to
statements of a testator as evidence for or against the validity
of a will." On the face of it, this statute seems to go even
further than the Colorado statute and is not hampered by any
of the restrictions found in the Colorado statute. However,
the Massachusetts statute seems to have been invoked only in
cases in which the declaration was not made under a sense of
impending death, but in which the declarant had simply deceased subsequent to his making the declaration, and was there-
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fore not available. Thus, it would seem that this statute does
not apply strictly to dying declarations, although I believe it
could be invoked in a civil or criminal case in which it was
desired to introduce the dying declaration of a person as we
understand the term.
No other state appears to have changed the rule by statute, but Kansas has done so by judicial decision. In the case
of Thurston v. Fritz, supra, decided in 1914, the action was
one for the recovery of the balance due from the defendants
for a tract of land formerly owned by the plaintiff's testator.
The testator, under the belief that he was about to die, signed
a statement purporting to give the facts of the transaction involved. The court held that this evidence should have been
allowed, Justice West stating, "The rule that dying declarations are admissible only in criminal cases is without reasonable basis and should no longer be followed." This rule seems
to be that which is closest to the Colorado statute, though the
restrictions to the rule found in the Colorado statute are not
set out in the opinion itself.
The Colorado statute, having been passed at so recent a
date, has not, as yet, been construed by the Supreme Court, so
the various problems which might arise under it, and which
we shall proceed to discuss, are really matters of conjecture, the
solutions of which we can only determine at this time by examining decisions of this state concerning dying declarations
made before the statute was enacted and decisions arrived at
by states having similar statutes, as well as states having no
such statute, but which have given certain constructions to the
rule when applying it in homicide cases. Since it was such
writers as Wigmore who led to the adoption of our statute, it
can be assumed, also, that our court may turn to their discussions of the various phases of the rule.
When the statute says that the declaration must be made
under a sense of impending death, it leaves unsettled the question as to how that apprehension might be shown, whether by
words of the declarant, or circumstances, or words and circumstances. The Colorado case of Weaver v. People, 47 Colo.
617, 100 P. 331 (1910), stated that it is essential to the admission of dying declarations that they be made under a sense
of impending death, but it is not necessary that the person
making them state at the time that they are so made, as that
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fact may be proved either by the express language of the declarant, or be inferred from the evident danger, or the opinions
of attendants stated to him, or from his conduct or other circumstances of the case. In accord with this case are People v.
Taylor, 59 Cal. 640 (1881); People v. Gray, 61 Cal. 164
(1882); People v. Vukejovich, 143 P. 1058 (Cal. App.,
1914); State v. Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 P. 456; State v. Ju
Nun, 53 Ore. 1. Again, in Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192,
34 P. (2d) 71 (1934), it was said that to make a dying declaration admissible, it is not necessary that the declarant should
have stated at the time that it was made under a sense of impending death. State v. Franklin, 192 N. C. 723, 135 S. E.
859 (1927), held that dying declarations by one conscious
of approaching death are admissible, though he did not declare
that he was dying; and State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E.
604 (1930) stated that for the admission of dying declarations, the declarant need not have expressed belief in impending demise, if the circumstances indicated that decedent was
fully under the influence of the solemnity of such belief and
so near death as to "lose the use of all deceit." Wigmore states
that "consciousness of approaching death may be determined
by all the attending circumstances. Any means of inferring
the existence of such knowledge is sufficient and such is the
settled judicial attitude. The circumstances of each case will
show whether the requisite consciousness existed. (Wigmore,
Vol. 3, 2d Ed., Sec. 1442.) A slight variation of this rule is
to be found in Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546, 238 P. 25
(1925), a prosecution for murder, in which, on the question
of the admissibility of dying declarations, the court said that
how the deceased obtained or how he expressed an understanding that he was about to die is immaterial. Another modification of the rule is stated in People v. Garcia, 63 Cal. 19
(1883), in which the court said that the sense of impending
death may be shown by one witness and the dying declaration
proved by another. There does not seem to be anything in the
Colorado statute which would abolish the rule set out in the
above stated Colorado cases, and the circumstance that the two
North Carolina cases were decided subsequently to the enactment of their statute allowing dying declarations in civil actions to a limited extent and that the two Oregon cases were
decided only a year before the enactment of the statute in that
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state, besides the fact that Wigmore, whom this state has followed so closely in adopting a more liberal application of the
rules concerning dying declarations, was in accord with this
rule, lends weight to the proposition that Colorado would
still, under the 1937 statute, allow the apprehension of pending death to be shown by either the words of the declarant or
the circumstances of the case, or both.
Once it has been determined that the declaration was actually made under a sense of impending death, the question
arises, "Suppose the declarant, having made an admissible dying declaration, later regains hope?" The Kansas case of State
v.Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 37 P. 174 (1894) sets out the rule that
the fact that death did not immediately ensue after the declarations and that the declarant subsequently hoped for recovery
does not prevent their admission as dying declarations; and the
case of State v.Shaffer, 23 Ore. 555, 32 P. 545 (1893), held
that where dying declarations admitted in evidence were made
in the morning, evidence of declarations made in the afternoon,
expressing a hope of recovery, is inadmissible, being immaterial. State v. Wilmhusse, 8 Idaho 608, 70 P. 849 (1902),
stated that evidence that a person making a dying declaration
was incompetent to do so two days after it was made is inadmissible. It must be confined to the time of making the declaration. The California Civil Code, Sec. 1870, says, "In criminal actions, one who believes he is about to die and entertains
no hope for recovery is a dying person; and a statement made
in that belief, relating to the cause of his injury, is admissible
where it appears that he subsequently died from the direct
effects of his wound, though he may have revived after making
the statement, or he may have lived a considerable time thereafter, and may have again begun to hope for recovery." Wigmore states that "a subsequent change of the expectation of
death by the recurrence of a hope of life does not render inadmissible a prior declaration made while the consciousness prevailed, though a repetition of the declaration during the subsequent inadequate state of mind would not be admissible.
(Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2ndEd., Sec. 1439.) It seems, from these
authorities and decisions, that a recurrence of a hope of life
after the declaration has been made will not render the declaration inadmissible, and it does not appear that the Colorado
courts would be constrained to hold differently. The wording
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of the statute is that "at the time of the making of such declaration, he was conscious of approaching death and believed
there was no hope of recovery." The statute says nothing
concerning the later return of hope in the breast of the declarant, and would probably, along with the weight of authority,
allow the declarations. However, this does not dispose of the
further problem of a declarant who, after making a dying declaration under a sense of impending death, later recovers but
becomes unavailable in court because of insanity, absence from
the jurisdiction, or some similar disability. On this proposition the above authorities are silent, although the California
Code says that dying declarations as to the cause of the injury
are admissible where the declarant subsequently died from the
direct effects of his wound. It seems probable that if the Colorado statute should be construed strictly as it stands, the
words, "The dying declarations of a deceased person shall be
admissible * * *" mean that the person must be actually
deceased, and that if he should later recover, even though he
be unavailable, his testimony may not be admitted as a dying
declaration. I don't believe that a broader construction can
be given to the words of the statute. Also, North Carolina,
having a statute similar to ours, held in the case of State v.
Wallace, 203 N. C. 284, 165 S. E. 716 (1932), that dying
declarations are admissible only if the declarant was in actual
danger of death and fully apprehended such danger when they
were made, and death ensued before they were offered. Greater
weight may be added to this contention as to how Colorado
would hold by the words of Elliott, "The declarant must be
(Elliott, Vol. 1,
dead when the declarations are offered."
Sec. 347.)
From this follows the question of whether the declarant
may, under a sense of impending death, reaffirm a declaration
which was not made under a sense of impending death. In
Flor v. People, 73 Colo. 403, 215 P. 875 (1923), a prosecution for murder, where it appeared that the declarant had made
oral statements, identified the defendant, and signed a written
declaration, naming the defendant before being told that death
was imminent, but later affirmed these statements after being
so told, it was held that such dying declarations should be
admitted. In accord with this is People v. Crews, 102 Cal.
174, 36P. 367 (1894). ButPeople v. Smith, 164 Cal. 451,
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129 P. 785, adds that while such statements may be reaffirmed,
later statements made by the declarant when he either could
not appreciate their consequences or, due to extreme illness or
recklessness, was willing to give the answers he thought
wanted, were not sufficient to show a reaffirmance. The case
of State v. Barbour, 142 Kan. 200, 46 P. (2d) 841 (1935),
held that in a murder prosecution, a dying declaration was
competent, notwithstanding the fact that it was taken by
question and answer a few days before the declarant had lost
hope of life, when it was restated and confirmed as true at a
time when clearly he had lost much hope. Wigmore states
that "a declaration made during an inadequate state of mind
may become admissible by a subsequent affirmance of it, made
when the realization of impending death has supervened."
The wording of
(Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1439.)
the Colorado statute, however, is that "at the time of the making of such declarationhe was conscious of approaching death
and believed there was no hope of recovery. It is manifest
that this leaves little room for a construction which would say
that although at the time of making the declaration, the declarant was not conscious of approaching death, he later
became conscious of pending death and reaffirmed his declaration, and therefore it should be admitted in evidence. He must
have been conscious of the pendency of death at the time he
made the declaration.
The question arises of how immediate after the making
of the declaration must be the death of the declarant, or how
close at hand the decease must appear to the declarant himself.
In Regina v. Gloster, 16 Cox, c. c. 471, Charles, J., said, "The
declarant must be under a settled, hopeless expectation of
death. Immediate death must be construed in the sense of
death impending, not on the instant, but within a very, very
short period indeed. In other words, the test is whether all
hope of life has been abandoned, so that the person making the
statement thinks that death must follow." The authority of
the cases and writers cited in our last section would seem to
stand for the more modern principle that there need only be a
relinquishing of all hope and a pendency of death, and it is not
essential that such death be seen as immediate. Garcia v. People, 64 Colo. 172, 171 P. 754 (1918), decided that the statement of one who expected to die was admissible, though he
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lived for fifteen days. I believe this proposition would be followed by the court in construing the Colorado statute, and we
may say that the requisite of definite apprehension of death
having been met, there is no definite period of time within
which the declarant must have contemplated his decease, but
that it must be short enough to have rendered his statement as
made "in the fear of shortly meeting his Maker."
The problem has often been brought before the courts,
and will likely be brought before the Colorado court, of
whether the dying declarations are admissible if there be other
evidence also available, or in other words, whether the necessity actually must exist. The older authorities seem to hold to
the doctrine that the necessity must exist, so as to justify the
rule allowing dying declarations on the basis of the lack of
other evidence. But the trend has been to break away from
this point of view. Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546 (1925),
stands for the proposition that the declaration is admissible
even if the facts can be shown otherwise. In McCredie v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 142 Ore. 229, 20 P. (2d)
232 (1933), the court said the condition that the declarant
must be the only eye-witness is not a prerequisite to the introduction of dying declarations. Elliott states, "It has been
urged that dying declarations should not be admitted where
there is no necessity, as where there are other competent eyewitnesses. But the weight of authority is to the effect that
admissibility of dying declarations is not dependent upon the
absence of other evidence of the same facts. Neither is the
declaration necessarily excluded by the circumstance that the
fact of the killing is conceded by the accused." Thus, I believe
we may say that, following the rules of the Colorado case and
the other authorities above cited, nothing in the statute being
to the contrary, Colorado would say that dying declarations
may be admitted in evidence along with other testimony on
the same point.
A question which is certain to come before the courts in
Colorado and the rule of which may have been entirely
changed in this state by the statute, is that of whether the declaration must be confined to the actual cause of the death of
the declarant and the circumstances surrounding such death.
The Oregon case of State v. Fuller, supra, decided in 1908,
stated that the dying declarations of a woman on whom an
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abortion has been performed are not admissible where her
death is not an essential element of the offense, which is complete without it; but where her death is, by statute, an indispensable element of the crime charged, her dying declarations
are admissible. This despite an Oregon statute which says
that, "one performing an abortion shall, in case of the death
of the woman, be guilty of manslaughter, and the dying declarations of such woman are, so far as they explain the circumstances attending the injury causing death, competent." A
Colorado court of appeals case, in 1894, held that where an
autopsy shows that the injuries were not the cause of the death,
the dying declarations of the deceased as to who inflicted the
injuries are not admissible. North Carolina, having a statute
similar to ours, held, in 1933, that dying declarations must be
confined to facts connected with the act of killing and forming
a part of the res gestae (State v. Layton, 204 N. C. 704, 169
S. E. 650); and State v. Dalton, 206 N. C. 507, 174 S. E.
422, affirmed this decision and added that the declarations
were not competent as to acts antecedent and unrelated to the
act causing death. Statev. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154S. E. 604
(1930), decided that dying declarations are not rendered incompetent because they contain statements tending to show
provocation or lack thereof on the part of the accused, when
such utterances relate immediately to the act of killing. In
accord with the proposition that the declarations are admissible only where they relate to the circumstances of the death
or are part of the res gestae are State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257
(1872); People v. Fong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8, 11 P. 323
(1909); State v. Swartz, 188 Wash. 21, 182 P. 953. An
extension of the rule is to be found in People v. Cipolla, 155
Cal. 224, 100 P. 252, which held that the res gestae embraces
not only the actual facts of the assault and the circumstances
surrounding it, but matters antecedent to it, as well as the acts
immediately following the assault. State v. Le Duc, 89 Mont.
545, 300 P. 919 (1931), restated that statement in a dying
declaration that the defendant struck a third person was admissible as part of the res gestae of the killing. An even further extension is shown in State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85
P. 251 (1906), which said that dying declarations are admissible though the description given does not identify the person
who did the shooting as the defendant, it being enough that
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they add a link in the chain of evidence. Finally, People v.
Attema, 75 Cal. App. 642, 243 P. 461 (1926), decided that
statements in a dying declaration are admissible though not
strictly res gestae. It is to be noted, however, that in all the
above cases, the action was one for the death of the declarant.
The Colorado statute allows dying declarations in both civil
and criminal actions of any nature. Hence, a dying declaration could not be restricted to the res gestae or circumstances
of the declarant's death. The statute says, "The dying declarations of a deceased person shall be admissible

*

*

*

to

the same extent and for the same purposes that they might
have been admissible had the deceased survived and been sworn
as a witness in the proceedings." Thus, where the action is
not a criminal prosecution or a civil action for the death of the
declarant, it would seem that the dying declarations might be
admitted to prove the truth of any matter occurring at any
time previous to the declaration, as, for instance, that the declarant had loaned money to the defendant at some time past,
and which the defendant now owes to the estate of the declarant. Such matter would be allowable in evidence if the declarant had been alive and so testified on the stand, and under the
statute, it should be admissible as his dying declaration. If
such dying declarations be admissible in civil actions in which
the cause being tried is not the death of the declarant, there
seems to be no logical reason why they should not be allowed
in criminal prosecutions or civil actions for the death of the
declarant as well. The declarant, if alive, could testify as to
matters not a part of the res gestae, which led to the assault on
him, from which it so happens that he died. Thus, we may
say that in Colorado, under the statute, dying declarations
need not be confined to the circumstances or the res gestae of
the killing of the declarant.
A very important question is that of how far a declarant
may go in stating his opinions or conclusions in a dying declaration. In Hollywood v. State, 19 Wyo. 493, 120 P. 471
(1912), it was held that "opinions in dying declarations are
inadmissible. It is indispensable that the dying declarations
should consist only of facts, and not of conclusions, mental
* impressions, or opinions." This seems to be the general rule.
The courts are not, however, in harmony as to what constitutes an opinion and what constitutes the statement of a fact
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within the rule stated, although all seem to agree that the statement by the declarant of a conclusion founded upon an inferred, as distinguished from an actual fact within his knowledge is objectionable. This rule is clearly stated in House v.
State, 94 Miss. 107, 48 S. 3, in which the court says, "To us,
the true and proper test as to admissibility is whether the statement is the direct result of observation through declarant's
senses, or comes from a source of reasoning from collateral
facts. If the former, it is admissible; if the latter, it is inadmissible." State v. Wright, 112 Ia. 436, 84 N. W. 541, rejected
a dying declaration to the effect that the deceased stated that he
did not think the defendant intended to shoot him, and further
that he thought defendant was crazy, the court saying that
declarations made under the solemn sense of approaching death
are only competent as to facts to which the witness might testify if living. In Hollywood v. State, supra, the facts surrounding the homicide were all testified to by eye-witnesses,
and there was no question of the identity of the accused; the
dying declaration of the decedent that the accused was not to
blame, but that it was decedent's own fault was excluded as
mere opinion. In an early Colorado court of appeals case, McBride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 87 P. 953 (1894), a statement by the declarant that "my husband has killed me," based
on the theory of her physician that her death was the result of
certain external injuries, was held inadmissible as a dying declaration, being merely the deceased's opinion. Again in Jamison v. People, 52 Colo. 11, 119 P. 474, where the decedent,
after having been shot, stated that the accused had murdered
him, such statement, although made with a realization of impending death, was inadmissible as a dying declaration, because it stated a conclusion. These Colorado cases, however,
seem to have gone further than should be permitted in distinguishing between fact and. opinion. The statement, "He murdered me" should not cease to be competent as a dying declaration merely because in the statement of the act there is also an
appraisal of the crime. The substance of the statement should
be examined, rather than its technical form. Although it
would be improper for a witness on the stand to use equivalent
words to appraise the nature of a man's crime, he could, nevertheless, identify the man by the use of a common expression
such as this; and under the statute such a statement should be

DICTA

393

admitted in a dying declaration also. This is the view of the
court in People v. Vukojevich, 25 Cal. App. 459, 143 P.
1058, in which it was held that a statement by the deceased,
fatally stabbed, that defendant "has killed me" was not an
expression of an opinion or a conclusion. In People v. Taylor, 59 Cal. 640 (1881), it held that one who supposed himself to have been poisoned and who was in fact near death,
though it was not quite apparent that he was aware of it,
said that he "guessed" that the defendant had poisoned him.
This was held inadmissible, the court saying that this was a
mere matter of opinion and not of fact. It was stated in People v. Lanagan, 81 Cal. 142, 22 P. 482 (1889), that expressions of opinion by the decedent as to the character of the injuries of which he is dying are inadmissible as dying declarations.
Massachusetts, which, as we have seen, has a statute even more
comprehensive than ours, held in the case of Barney v. Magenis, 135 N. E. 142 (1922), that where one struck by an
automobile and sustaining injuries from which he subsequently died testified that the car dragged him twenty-five to
thirty feet, his further testimony that the car must have been
going thirty to thirty-five miles per hour wes the expression
of a fact derived from the exercise of his own senses, and not
merely an opinion or guess, and was therefore admissible.
Eldridge v. Barton, 122 N. E. 272 (Mass., 1919), decided
that a statement of the deceased that he was at fault and to
blame for the accident was merely the assertion of an opinion,
as distinguished from one of fact; and it was not admissible
under the statute, which requires such a declaration to be made
upon the declarant's personal knowledge. It was held in Little
v. Massachusetts Northeastern St. Ry. Co., 112 N. E. 77
(Mass., 1916), that an opinion expressed by a deceased physician, who had attended plaintiff's intestate, as to the cause of
his condition was not based on his personal knowledge, and
was inadmissible, although the physician, if alive, could have
given such opinion in court without qualifying as an expert.
The North Carolina rule was set out in State v. Beal, supra,
which said that dying declarations are admissible in homicide
cases, provided the declarant, if living and offered as a witness,
would be competent to testify to matters contained in the declarations. Wigmore, on this point, is admittedly contra to the
general rule when he says, "The opinion rule has no applica-
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tion to dying declarations. The theory of the rule is that inferences drawn by the witness can be equally well drawn by
the jury. Since the declarant is here deceased, no more detailed
data may be drawn from him than his statement contains, and
hence, his inferences in this instance are not superfluous, but
are indispensable. But the courts seem to accept the opinion
rule as applicable." (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1447.)
Under the Colorado statute, the dying declarations are admitted only to the extent that such declarations would be
allowed if the witness were alive and on the stand. If he were
alive, his opinions would not be admissible in evidence, and I
think that we may say that the Colorado court, under this
statute, would not follow Wigmore's line of reasoning, but
would abide by the weight of authority and the earlier Colorado cases.
The Colorado case of Zipperion v. People, supra, sets out
the rule that written, as well as oral, dying declarations may be
admitted in evidence; and nothing in the statute seems to abrogate this, so long as the written declaration is not a set of
questions and answers. Weaver u. People, supra, held that
where the declarant was shot and believed death was at hand
and his statements were written down by a person present,
though not in the exact language of the decedent, and declarant was asked, when the statements were read to him, if they
were true and if he would affix his signature, to which he
replied, "Yes," but was too weak to affix his signature and
placed his mark, the statements were admissible. It is possible
that under the statute, the Colorado court would overrule this
decision, unless it could be proven beyond a doubt that the
statements were purely voluntary and no persuasion was
brought to bear on the declarant. People v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32
(1858), held that if the declarations of the dying person were
reduced to writing, the writing must first be introduced, if
accessible. After that, it may be supported by proof of other
declarations, not so reduced. This would probably be so held
in Colorado. State v. Abrams, 115 Kan. 520, 223 P. 301,
set out that the fact that the dying declaration is made in a
writing which has been lost does not prevent a witness who
heard it from testifying to what was said to and by the declarant, regardless of the contents of the writing. The rule we
have considered as to the reaffirmance of a declaration made
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when declarant was not under a sense of impending death applies also to a later reaffirmance of a written declaration made
before the declarant has given up hope, and it was so held in
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 60 S. W. 400 (Ky.), and State v.
McEvoyt, 19 S. C. 208. Wigmore states, "Where the auditor
of a dying declaration makes in written form a note or report
of the oral utterances, this written statement of the auditor is
not preferred testimony and need not be produced; for no
principle of evidence prefers a person's written memorandum
of testimony to his or another person's oral or recollection testimony." The author then goes on to say that where such
written memorandum is read to the declarant and assented to
or signed by him, it should become a second and distinct declaration by him, and the two should not become merged.
However, he says, the courts generally require the writing to
be used, excluding testimony as to the oral statement. (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1450.) I believe the Colorado
court would, on this point, be inclined to follow the rule of
Wigmore, rather than that of the majority of the courts, since
the Colorado statute abides by Wigmore's line of reasoning in
spirit, and under it the court would be likely to follow his rules
wherever possible; and it would probably do so here, since
there is nothing in the statute which would prevent it from so
holding.
It is generally held that dying declarations may be impeached in the same manner as if the witness lived and taken
the stand. Cases so holding include.State v. Kocar, 74 Mont.
269, 240 P. 365 (1925); State v. Watts, 52 Nev. 493, 290
P. 732 (1930); McClendon v. State, 360 Okla. Cr. 11, 251
P. 515 (1926); State v. Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 P. 456
(1908); State v. Gollegos, 28 N. M. 403, 213 P. 1030
(1923); Liddellv. State, 18Okla. Cr. 87, 193 P. 52 (1920).
The Oregon case of State v. Fuller, supra, said that the statute
prescribing the manner of laying a foundation for the impeachment of a witness by proof of statements inconsistent
with his testimony does not apply to dying declarations, for
no opportunity is offered the accused to interrogate the declarant. The Colorado case of Salas v. People, 51 Colo. 461, 118
P. 992 (1911), held that a dying declaration may be impeached by evidence of other inconsistent statements. But under the present statute, the impeachment could be made in any
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other way as well. At least one case has allowed impeachment
of the witness relating the declaration: State v. Fong Loom,
29 Ida. 248, 158 P. 233 (1916), decided that where the victim of a homicide was a Chinaman, unfamiliar with the
English language, evidence that the interpreter of the dying
declaration was addicted to the use of opium or other drugs
was admissible. Wigmore states, "Declarant is open to impeachment and discrediting in the same way as other witnesses.
This includes prior or subsequent inconsistent statements. So
also, he may be corroborated by evidence of similar consistent
statements." (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec. 1446.) Under the Colorado statute, cases in this state would undoubtedly be in accord with the general proposition. The statute
says that "dying declarations shall be admissible * * * to
the same extent and for the same purposes that they might
have been admissible had the deceased survived and been
sworn as a witness in the proceedings." Of course, if the deceased had survived and been sworn as a witness, his testimony
would have been subject to impeachment.
Related to, though not quite the same as, impeachment
of the dying declaration is the question of whether the declarant's religious beliefs may be shown. This is not exactly the
same problem as that of impeachment, because the religious
beliefs of the ordinary witness, when allowed to be brought
into evidence, permitted for the purpose of proving him incapable of taking an oath, whereas they are offered to impeach
dying declarations to prove that the declarant had no fear of
"meeting his Maker" and hence, no motive for telling the
truth. The general rule appears to be that religious beliefs of
the declarant may not be shown. A statement of this rule is
set out in State v. Yee Gueng, 57 Ore. 509, 112 P. 424
(1910), which held that the religious belief or the want
thereof or lack of confidence in a future state of rewards and
punishments is not an element bearing on the credibility or
weight of the declarations, and the lower court properly refused to charge the jury that they could consider, as affecting
the credibility of the declarant, that he did not believe in future
rewards or punishments at the time he made such declarations.
In accord with this case are People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29
(1872); People v. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 547 (1877);
People v.Lun Foon, 29 Cal. App. 270, 155 P. 477. A stat-
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ute exists in Colorado which reads, "No person shall be
deemed incompetent to testify as a witness on account of his
or her opinion in relation to the Supreme Being or a future
state of rewards and punishments; nor shall any witness be
questioned in regard to his or her religious opinions." (Colorado Statutes Annotated, Vol. 4, Chap. 177, Sec. 7.) Although, as I have stated above, a distinction exists between the
rules as to the religious beliefs of witnesses and those of the
makers of dying declarations, I believe Colorado would, as
other states have done, apply the statute to dying declarations.
Thus in the California case of People v. Sanford, supra, the
court held that since in that state no person is incompetent as
a witness on account of his religious beliefs, a dying declaration
is admissible, though the declarant has said nothing in regard
to his responsibility to his Maker.
A question which has come before the courts on numerous occasions is the problem of who determines the competency of a dying declaration, and once the declaration is admitted, who determines what weight and credibility shall be
given to it. It is well settled that the competency of the declaration is to be determined by the court and the weight and
credibility to be given to it are determined by the jury. In
accord with this rule are Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256, 86
P. 79 (1906); Flor v. People, 73 Colo. 403, 215 P. 875
(1923); State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 37 P. 174 (1894);
State v. Shaffer, 23 Ore. 555, 32 P. 545 (1893); State v.
Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 P. 456. The case of Willoughby v.
Territory, 16 Okla. 577, 86 P. 56 (1906), set out the rule
that the court's failure to pass on the question of competency
as evidence of a dying declaration and submission of such declaration to the jury without first passing on such competency
is error. I believe that undoubtedly, the Colorado court
would hold with the majority and earlier Colorado cases as
to the determination of the competency and the weight and
credibility of such declarations, since such a holding would be
perfectly consistent with the statute. The competency and
admissibility in evidence of any other testimony is determined
by the court, and there is no reason why this should not apply
to dying declarations as well.
The only cases discussing the point hold that dying declarations are available in behalf of the accused, as well as
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against him. Such was the doctrine in People v. Southern,
120 Cal. 645, 53 P. 214 (1898), in which the court said that
dying declarations are admissible in behalf of the accused to
show that the killing was by another person. In accord are
People v. Costa, 67 Cal. App. 175, 227 P. 201, and Morehead
v. State, 120 Okla. Cr. 62, 151 P. 1183. Wigmore, on this
point, says, "The theory that the dying declarations cannot
be used by the accused has no foundation whatever and has
been generally repudiated." (Wigmore, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Sec.
1452.) The court in this state would probably follow the
general line of authority and Wigmore on this question, since
there is nothing in the statute which would prohibit such a
holding.
The problem may arise of whether the dying declaration
of a person, in which he states the dying declaration of another,
would be admissible. In states holding that the statements in
the dying declaration must relate to the circumstances of the
death, such a dying declaration would obviously not be admissible. However, in Colorado, where the dying declaration
need not be so confined, there seems to be no reason for so
excluding it, except for the fact that the dying declaration
would be mere hearsay evidence, and hearsay not being admissible by a witness on the stand, the Colorado statute would
probably not allow such dying declaration. It is true that
dying declarations are themselves hearsay, as related by the
auditor of the declaration; but they are statements of facts
arising from actual knowledge of the declarant and when admitted in evidence, the knowledge of the declarant himself is
not derived from hearsay. Knowledge of the declarant obtained from the dying declaration of another declarant is hearsay. Thus, if the declarant himself had survived and were on
the stand, he would not be allowed to give hearsay testimony,
and under the statute, the testimony related to the witness by
the declarant, who learned it from hearsay, cannot be admitted.
A question which has sometimes been disputed is that of
whether, when A is accused of having killed X and Y and is
on-trial for the murder of X, the dying declaration of Y should
be admitted. The courts seem to be split on this point. In
Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 Ky. 709, 268 S. W. 346
(1925), Hayes, Dunn, and Mathews were killed. As to the
admissibility of the dying declaration of Dunn, on the trial of
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the defendant for the murder of Hayes, the court said, "It is
well settled that dying declarations are admissible only in those
criminal cases where the death of the deceased is the subject of
the charge, and the dying declaration of a witness to a homicide
is not admissible although he was a party to the controversy
resulting in the homicide." In accord with this are State v.
Fitzhugh, 2 Ore. 227 (1867), and State v. Bohan, 15 Kan.
407 (1875). Contra to it are State v. Tewell (S. C.), 12
Rich. 321, and State v. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558. Since we
have seen that Colorado, under the statute, would probably
say that dying declarations need not be confined to the res gestae or the circumstances surrounding the murder in a homicide
case, and there is no reason why, in Colorado, a witness to a
homicide cannot state the facts of the homicide in a dying declaration, Colorado would probably hold that such a dying
declaration could be given.
Generally speaking, dying declarations are safe evidence,
and the ends of justice are promoted by permitting them. But
I am inclined to believe that the Colorado statute goes a trifle
too far, in allowing such evidence to the same extent as if the
declarant had been alive and sworn as a witness, when it is
borne in mind that the adverse party has not the power of
cross-examination and the declarant is not under oath. It
should also be recollected that in some cases, passion, hatred,
and other feelings of like nature will have their effect, even at
the point of death; and it is infinitely more difficult to impeach
the statement of the declarant for these grounds than it would
be to impeach the testimony of a living witness. Thus, dying
declarations should not be given the same weight and value by
a jury as should the testimony of a living witness. It is true,
the statute applies only to the acceptance of the declarations in
evidence, and such a wide latitude in their admissibility would
be most commendable if we could be assured that juries would
not place too much weight upon such evidence. But the rule,
as we have seen, being that the weight and credibility of such
evidence is a question exclusively for the determination of the
jury, the court may not even instruct them as to how much
weight and credibility to give to the dying declarations. Nevertheless, there no longer exists any reason why, if such evidence is to be admitted in cases of homicide, it should not be
admitted in other criminal and in civil cases as well; and the
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Colorado statute has taken a long stride in letting down the
bars to a great field of evidence otherwise not admissible and
which is often the only evidence obtainable, or is very important evidence in the determination of a cause. The state is to
be highly lauded on expanding the former much too narrow
application of the rule as to the admissibility in evidence of
dying declarations.
SURVEY OF EL PASO COUNTY COURT RECORDS

REVEALS PROBATE PROCEDURE IS SLOW
AND COSTLY
Less Than a Third of the Bar Get Four-Fifths of the Work
Reported by NORMAN W. BAKER*

AYMEN often ask the lawyer, "How long does it take
to settle an estate?" Although knowing the layman's
~usual
incomprehension of, and impatience with, the time
consumed to satisfy requirements of the law, the lawyer in all
sincerity is usually apt to reply that it will take approximately
a year or fourteen months if the estate doesn't get into litigation or encounter some similar delay. In Colorado such a
statement is probably misleading-that is, it is misleading if
the experience elsewhere is the same as in El Paso County. A
comprehensive survey of the probate records of that county
recently completed by the writer brought out the fact that the
averagetime elapsed in all the estates from the filing of affidavit
of decease or other first paper to the entry of decree of final settlement (or order of discharge, if any) runs from about twice
to almost thrice the above time, depending upon the size of the
estate."
Before attempting to point out other interesting facts of
probate practice revealed by this study, something might well
be said about the nature of the survey itself. From the files of
every decedent's estate filed in the El Paso County Court in the
four-year period from January 1, 1933, to January 1, 1937,
wherein the gross inventoried value was $7,500 or more, thir*Of Colorado Springs. Member of the El Paso Bar Association and member of
the State Bar Committee on Economic Survey.
'See Table 1 for exact averages.
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ty-three different items of information were recorded. This
data covered everything from decedent's sex and date of death
to the value and kinds of his property and the amount, if any,
he left in trust. In order to obtain the averages on various
matters discussed herein, the estates were grouped as follows:
Class A-$
7,500 up to $ 15,000 gross inventory value
Class B-$15,001 up to $ 25,000 gross inventory value
Class C-$25,00 1 up to $ 50,000 gross inventory value
Class D-$50,00 1 up to $100,000 gross inventory value
Class E-Over $100,000 gross inventory value.
It was impossible to include estates filed since the end of 1936
because so many of them are not yet closed and the data about
them would be only fragmentary.
No attempt will be made to explain those extended periods of administration which existed in these estates. One
thing is certain, it is not due to litigation. Out of a total of
198 estates surveyed only eleven of them (seven testate and
four intestate) had what may here be termed litigation. By
"litigation" is meant, matters contested in court by opposing
lawyers-something more than mere routine admission of
will, obtaining orders for sale and distribution, decrees, and the
like. So those lawyers not yet fully initiated into probate
practice who are perhaps hopeful of "a world of litigation in
that regard" are unlikely to find it in probate.
Strange how the news of the death of some moneyed gentlemen travels so fast and so far. In several cases where the
decedent died intestate, it was amazing how many previouslyseldom-heard-from heirs suddenly bobbed up all aroundready and willing to litigate over their alleged place in the distributive sun. And litigate they did. Those contests to determine heirs and those cases for construction of the language of
wills seem to be the most prolific sources of what litigation
there is.
As is the case in many other fields of the law, probate
practice in substantial volume is handled by a relatively few
lawyers. The total gross inventoried value of all the estates
surveyed was $8,937,996, consisting of $7,177,197 of personal property and $1,760,799 of real property. During the
period under consideration there were approximately 61 lawyers in active practice within the county, but a number of them
did not act for a single personal representative administering
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an estate with gross inventory of $7,500 or more. The survey
showed 18 lawyers represented $7,437,777 of the total gross
inventoried value of these estates. In other words, thirty per
cent of all the lawyers handled eighty-three per cent of the
probate work.
The writer is afraid that those younger members of the
bar who in dreamy moments visualize themselves as soon
achieving a state of opulence through a lusty probate practice
are likely to be disappointed. For if this survey is any criterion of the nature of such things, the vast majority of the decedents leaving estates of the values, herein described will have
aged considerably before passing on. And unless such lawyers
have made themselves the cronies, so to speak, of persons of
later middle age (or have otherwise received their patronage),
it is hardly to be expected that they will be found representing
many of these more substantial estates early in their legal life.
In this study the average age of all testators at the time of executing their wills was 63 years, while the average age of all testatrices was 67 years.
One of the most interesting of all the wills probated during this period was one written entirely in Yiddish. As far as
the writer could determine, the will was written by the decedent himself. The gentleman who made it, while engaged in
a manufacturing enterprise on a very modest scale, left an estate considered fairly substantial for the region and the time
(1935).
Its net value for inheritance tax purposes was
$71,488 and a large part of it was in the form of bank deposits. Of course the will was admitted but only after the expense
of formalities for its interpretation. Another expense which
that particular testator might have saved his estate was for
large bond premiums, since the personal representatives were
legatees and close relatives of the decedent and had he paid a
modest fee to a lawyer for drafting his will, the lawyer might
have suggested that the executors be allowed to serve without
bond.
It was also found that in six other cases, decedents who
were not lawyers had a yen to try writing their own wills and
succeeded, at least in producing a will duly admitted to probate. The evidence in two other cases seemed to point strongly
to the proposition that banks, acting through their officers, had
drawn the wills. In connection with the wills, it should be
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stated that out of the 132 testate estates only 23 decedents had
provided for testamentary trusts. Of course the 66 intestate
decedents created no such trusts at all.
The writer doesn't suppose that any of those present will
be interested particularly in the attorneys' fees paid. However, as a purely academic pursuit, a careful record was kept
regarding this subject.
The smallest fee paid was in 1934-35 in an estate of
$30,604 gross where the decedent's son (a layman) acted as
administrator. His only recorded legal expense (and this was
confirmed by other research) was $5 paid to a local firm for
drafting an affidavit of decease, petition for letters, etc., filed in
opening the estate. The largest estate filed during this period
had a gross inventory of $880,169 and the attorneys' fees
amounted to $7,500. In the third largest estate filed, one with
a gross inventory value of $558,864, the lawyer was allowed
$4,000 but in this case the executor himself was a lawyer and
was allowed an executor's fee of $17,000.
On the other hand, in an estate with gross inventory of
$309,628 and net inheritance tax value of $356,836, the
court allowed attorneys' fees of $8,300. In each of these estates just mentioned there was no "litigation" as that term has
been herein defined. As is thus illustrated, it cannot be said
dogmatically that such fees have-nor should they have-any
invariable direct connection with the value of the estate. For
example, consider that $4,000 attorney fees were allowed in
each of the following estates, with gross inventory as shown:
$155,000, $199,000, $172,000, $116,000, $558,864, and
$192,000. As another example, $500 attorneys' fees were
paid in estates with the following gross inventory values:
$53,000, $11,000, $36,000, $13,000, $9,000, $85,000
$66,000, $23,000, $25,000, $16,000, $30,000, and
$15,000. Probably in each of these cases, there were special
circumstances that would account for the wide variation.
Nevertheless, a little help may be derived from the table
of percentages of inventory value paid in attorneys' fees,
shown in Table 2. In addition, if readers or their clients are
interested in the shrinkage of estates and the costs of probate
proceedings, Table 1 may be relied upon as carefully coinpiled
from the record.
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Special Committee Appointments Made by President;
Committee on Economic Survey of Bar Created
WO of the outstanding special committees created by the
Executive Committee are the ones on Legal Institutes and
Economic Survey of the Bar, according to William R.
Kelly, President of the association, who this month announced
the appointments to special committees.
The Committee on Revision of the Code is continuing
under the chairmanship of Philip S. Van Cise and its personnel, which has a personnel exceeding 60 members, is announced
by the chairman in a special article in this issue of DICTA.
The state bar adopted the Junior Bar Committee on Judicial Selection as the official Colorado Bar Association corn405
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mittee on the subject. This committee is charged with the
duty of suggesting methods of improving the selection of the
judiciary. The creation of a committee on unlawful practice
was also authorized, as was a committee to supervise publications of the association.
The committee on Economic Survey of the Bar will
function along the lines suggested by the Garrison Survey in
Wisconsin and other similar surveys conducted more recently
in the East, having for its investigation matters which affect
the income of practicing lawyers. Continuing with its effective work of last year, the committee on Legal Institutes under
the guidance of William E. Hutton will begin its series of local
gatherings immediately after the holidays.
The committee appointments follow:
ASSOCIATION PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE
Fraser Arnold, Denver, Chairman
Walter M. Appel, Denver
Henry S. Sherman, Denver
Bernard J. Seeman, Denver
James A. Woods, Denver
BY-LAWS COMMITTEE
Stanley T. Wallbank, Denver, Chairman
Laurence W. DeMuth, Boulder
John L. Stivers, Montrose
Robert R. Tarbell, Saguache
George C. Twombly, Fort Morgan
COOPERATION WITH AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTES COMMITTEE
Paul W. Lee, Denver, Chairman
Archibald A. Lee, Denver
Frank L. Moorhead, Boulder
Henry P. Weihofen, Boulder
Roger H. Wolcott, Denver
ETHICS COMMITTEE
Robert W. Steele, Jr., Denver, Chairman
Robert E. More, Denver
Joseph A. Craven, Denver
Albert L. Vogl, Denver
Lee J. West, Greeley
JUDICIAL SELECTION COMMITTEE
J. Ramsay Harris, Denver, Chairman
Charles A. Baer, Denver
Richard M. Davis, Denver
William V. Hodges, Jr., Denver
Donald T. Horn, Lamar
James L. Weinmeyer, Denver
LAW BOOK PUBLICATION COMMITTEE
Osmer E. Smith, Golden, Chairman
Thomas L. Bartley, Pueblo
Alvin L. Betke, Denver
Thomas C. Chapin, Denver
Lyman P. Weld, Longmont
LEGAL INSTITUTES COMMITTEE
William E. Hutton, Denver, Chairman
E. B. Adams, Grand Junction
Dayton Denious, Denver
Hubert D. Henry, Denver
J. Arthur Phelps, Pueblo
W. W. Platt, Alamosa
George H. Wilkes, Florence
TAXATION COMMITTEE
John L. J. Hart, Denver, Chairman
G. Dexter Blount, Denver
William D. Morrison, Denver
Albert J. Gould, Denver
Rudolph Johnson, Boulder
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UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEE
Mortimer Stone, Fort Collins, Chairman
Barnard Houtchens, Greeley
Max D. Melville, Denver
John L. Zanoni, Denver
Ronald V. Yegge, Denver
CODE REVISION COMMITTEE
Philip S. Van Cise, Denver, Chairman
See Article on This Committee in This Issue
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE BAR COMMITTEE
Laurence W. DeMuth, Boulder, Chairman
George T. Evans, Denver
Harlan Howlett, Boulder
Roger H. Wolcott, Denver
Harold Davies, Englewood
Sam T. Taylor, Walsenburg
Norman W. Baker, Colorado Springs
Arthur E. March, Fort Collins
Frederic B. Emigh, Durango
Stanley H. Johnson, Denver
Raymond L. Sauter, Sterling
John C. Banks, Grand Junction
David J. Miller, Greeley
Lawrence Thulemeyer, La Junta
Jesse E. Pound, Alamosa
Charles R. Corlett, Monte Vista
Sherman E. Walrod, Holyoke
Sidney M. Pleasant, Craig
Harry S. Petersen, Pueblo
LEGAL AID COMMITTEE
John E. Gorsuch, Denver, Chairman
Paul F. Irey, Denver
Alden T. Hill. Fort Collins
Albert B. Logan, Colorado Springs
Charles C. Sackmann, Denver
PUBLIC RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Erskine R. Myer, Denver, Chairman
Hamlet J. Barry, Denver
John A. Carruthers, Colorado Springs
Harry S. Petersen, Pueblo
Hubert D. Waldo, Jr., Greeley

PROGRESS OF THE CODE REVISION COMMITTEE
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE*

INCE the State Bar Association meeting at Colorado
Springs the Committee on Revision of the Code to the
Rules has met on every Monday night in studying the
Code and the Rules, and tentatively adopting its first draft of
the combined or revised procedure.
To date about 65 of the 86 Rules have been adopted for
the first draft, and some of the others in substance. In addition to the Rules the committee has covered arbitration, affidavits, mandamus, venue, replevin or claim and delivery, garnishment, and attachment. This leaves the remaining Rules
and the Code sections on certiorari, contempt, usurpation of
office, disputed boundaries, foreclosure of mortgages, lis pendens, possession, quiet title, recovery of realty, and a few mis*Of Denver, Chairman of the Committee.
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cellaneous sections. Reports have already been prepared by
the subcommittees covering these matters, and will be presented to the main committee as soon as they can be reached.
It is our present plan to hold meetings on Monday nights
until December 11 th, after which time the committee will
adjourn until January 15 th and then resume its meetings until
the initial draft has been completed. At that time we hope
that the Bar Association will have funds to print one hundred
copies of our initial draft, to which will be attached detailed
statements of the amendments which have been made, of the
statutes pertinent to each Rule, and data on Federal decisions
to date, which drafts will be used by the committee.
We will then adjourn until such date as the committee
shall fix, so that in the meantime the main committee may
study the draft as a whole, the statutes, and the decisions.
During that time the Forms Committee will prepare the necessary forms. The subcommittees will particularly check the
Rules which have been assigned to their groups. The main
committee will then be called back into action and will consider the reports of the subcommittees and complete its final
draft. When this is finished we will ask the Bar Association
to again provide funds to print this draft and mail it to every
lawyer in the state. After an interval a Revision Committee,
to be selected, will then re-check the work and the comments
of the lawyers, and prepare the final draft to be submitted to
the Supreme Court. From present indications this should be
some time in the fall of 1940.
A list of the present members of the committee follows:
PHILIP S. VAN CISE, Chairman

Charles J. Simon
Harry S. Petersen
Tom M. Burgess
Ben S. Wendelkin
John A. Carruthers
John M. Meikle
Herschel Horn
Mark H. Harrington
Darwin D. Coit
Horace N. Hawkins, Jr.
Charles H. Haines, Sr.
Mortimer Stone
M. E. H. Smith
Jacob S. Schey
David J. Miller
Edward L. Wood
Ira L. QuiatJean S. Breitens'tein

Joseph Hodges
John L. Zanoni
Arthur H. Laws
William R. Eaton
William L. Cohn
Bruce B. McCay
Harry S. Silverstein
Benjamin Griffith
Charles C. Sackmann
Charles J. Kelly
Thomas Keely
Frank E. Hickey
Fraser Arnold
Harold D. Roberts
Charles F. Brannan
Arthur R. Morrison
S. Hickman Walker
Edward V. Dunklee

H. Lawrence Hinkley
Guy K. Brewster
W. Clayton Carpenter
Ernest L. Fowler
John Turnquist
Fred Neef
Walter Appel
Churchill Owen
Louis A. Hellerstein
Royal C. Rubright
Golding Fairfield
Percy S. Morris
Fred W. Sanborn
Carle Whitehead
Hal George Chapman
Donald B. Robertson
Win. Hedges Robinson. Jr.
Tom Chapin
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Henry A. Dubbs, Past President of State Bar, Dies
Henry A. Dubbs, formerly of Denver, died at Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, on November 12, 1939, while visiting his son
and a brother. Mr. Dubbs was a member of the Colorado Bar
Association since its inception in 1898. He was elected president of the association in 19 13.
Born in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, on August 23, 1868,
he received his education at Franklin and Marshall College,
from which he was graduated with a Master of Arts degree in
1890. Immediately after graduation he came to Pueblo,
where he was associated with Charles E. Gast and T. H. Devine after being admitted to the Colorado bar in that year.
After twenty years of practice in Pueblo, he moved to
Denver. He formed a partnership with Henry C. Vidal in
1914 which association he continued until his death, although
he had retired from active practice several years ago.
He was counsel in many of the early irrigation cases arising in the Arkansas valley and was associated with other attorneys in representing Colorado in the Kansas-Colorado irrigation dispute. Judge Robert E. Lewis appointed him special
master in the Denver Tramway valuation case. Several years
ago his Alma Mater conferred upon him an honorary LL.D.
degree.
Mr. Dubbs was married in 1922, and his wife died two
years later. He is survived by his son, Henry M. Dubbs, who
is attending Hill School in Pottstown, and by two sisters and
a brother.
He was a member of several local clubs and the Phi Kappa
Psi fraternity. Funeral services were held in the East and
burial was in Philadelphia.

Weld County Bar Has 100% Dues Record
The monthly meeting of the association was held Tuesday, November 7, at the Rex Cafe, and was very well attended.
Present as guests of the association were County Judge
J. Edgar Chenoweth of Trinidad, and L. W. Newby of Longmont.
Weld County's bar association is happy to advise The
Colorado Bar Association that all thirty-seven of the practic-
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ing a:-d acting attorneys residing in the county have paid their
dues in full, and Weld County has registered another one hundred per cent financial record as far as dues are concerned.
It wishes to add further that two members who are not
active in the practice in Weld County have also paid their dues
so that an additional per cent can be added for our association.
The following committee appointments were made:
Committee on Legal Institutes:
Clay R. Apple, Chairman

John W. O'Hagan

Robert G. Smith

Committee on Uniform Fees:
Herbert Mann, Chairman

William R. Baab

Julian R. Dunn

Committee on Banquet with Medical Society in Weld County:
Roy Briggs, Chairman

John W. Henderson

Shirley Payne

This last committee was appointed to arrange a joint
banquet between the members of the legal and medical professions in Weld County in order to create closer relationship
between the two professions here.
-John

W. O'Hagan, Correspondent.

Mesa County Bar Meeting
The Mesa County Bar Association held a dinner meeting
at the LaCourt Hotel in Grand Junction on November 10.
President Charles M. Holmes discussed the State Bar Convention; J. P. Helman reported for the Central Library Committee; and Silmon Smith made a few remarks concerning the new
Federal Rules. E. B. Adams then gave a talk about the recent
C. I. 0. case in which he participated at Silverton, Colorado,
and traced the growth of unions in the Colorado mining industry.
It was voted to have another meeting within thirty days
for the purpose of election of officers.
J. Gregory Donohue, who has been practicing in Grand
Junction, recently moved, and it is reported that he has hung
out his shingle in Pueblo, his former home.
-- John C. Banks, Correspondent.

President Kelly Is Guest of Neighboring Bar Associations
William R. Kelly, our traveling ambassador, this month
journeys to Salt Lake City, where he will be the guest of the
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Utah State Bar Association at its annual meeting on December
9. In October, Mr. Kelly went to Cheyenne to attend the
meeting of the Wyoming Bar Association, which was considering by-laws proposed under the integrated bar act.
The Utah State Bar meeting has invited all of the bar
association presidents from the surrounding states to attend
the annual meeting as its guests. It is the desire of the Utah.
bar officials to encourage cooperative relationship between the
state bar executives by these invitations.
The proposed integration of the Wyoming bar will encircle Colorado with integrated bar systems, Mr. Kelly reported from his Wyoming visit. Utah was one of the early
states to integrate its bar and New Mexico followed several
years ago. Mr. Kelly states that the Wyoming association is
planning to launch a series of legal institutes this winter and
spring.
W. Felder Cook
W. Felder Cook, member of the Denver and Colorado
Bar Associations since 1922, died at Denver November 16,
1939, of pneumonia. Mr. Cook had been engaged in practice in Denver since 1921, and prior to that time was located
at Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
He was born at Paulding, Miss., January 15, 1881, received an A.B. degree at Millsaps College, and his LL.B. degree at the University of Mississippi in 1905. He was admitted
to the Mississippi bar the same year and practiced in that state
until 1920, when he removed to Texas, being admitted to the
bar there. The following year he moved to Denver, where he
has since lived.
He was a Mason, a Shriner, a member of Kappa Alpha
Fraternity, and of the Denver, the Colorado, and the American
Bar Associations.
Mr. Cook is survived by his wife, a son, two daughters,
a grandson, two brothers, and five sisters.
George A. Kilgore
George A. Kilgore, one of the pioneer attorneys in Otero
County, died at Long Beach, California, Monday, November
20th, at the age of 89.
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Mr. Kilgore began practicing law in La Junta in the early
'80's and practiced at that place until 1923, when he retired
from active practice, moving to California to live. During
his practice in La Junta, Mr. Kilgore was actively interested
in all civic matters and started the first public library for La
Junta. He also introduced into La Junta the English elm
which is now the most popular shade tree in the city.
--- G. S. Cosand, Correspondent.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LEGAL INSTITUTE
By WILL SHAFROTH, American Bar Association
An opportunity for the practicing lawyer to go back to school in
the literal sense of the term is being offered in an institute announced
by the University of Michigan Law School, to be held on its campus
June 22 to 24. The subjects of Labor Law, Taxation and Wills and
Trusts will be discussed by members of the law school faculty and by
practicing lawyers and every effort will be made to provide something
of interest and value to the members of the bar. Institutes in the past
have been brought to the lawyers and have been arranged so as to
necessitate the least possible effort on their part. The Michigan institute
is a departure from this program. It does not seek to bring the institute
to the lawyer but rather asks the lawyer to come to the institute for
three days, leaving behind him business and professional duties. The
excellent accommodations on the beautiful Law Quadrangle, presented
by the late William W. Cook of the New York bar, are available for
housing those who attend. The registration fee, including the cost of
these rooms for three days, will be but $10.00.
This new departure is interesting in itself as it will tend to show
whether advanced legal education actually has a strong enough attraction
to pull the lawyer out of his office. But the real significance of the three
days of sessions may be much deeper. They may show that the law
schools have a missio i to perform with reference to the continued education of the practicing bar and that the urge for knowledge on the part
of the bar is sufficient to bring lawyers back to the campus for a period
of study. Michigan may be the pioneer in an interesting and significant
future development in advanced legal education.
In general the work of the institute will be the discussion of
specific problems. In Taxation the lecturers will be Professor E. Blythe
Stason, who has been appointed to succeed Dean Henry M. Bates as
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Dean of the Law School when he retires at the end of the current year;
Mr. Morrison Shafroth of Denver, Colorado, former General Counsel
of the Internal Revenue Bureau, and Professor Paul G. Kauper, Editor
of the Michigan Law Review. Mr. Stason is a member of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and is well known
in the fields of Taxation, Administrative Law and Municipal Corporations. Mr. Albert E. Meder, member of the firm of Beaumont, Smith
and Harris, Detroit, Michigan, and Professor Russell A. Smith, formerly
associated with Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood of New York
City, and Mr. Charlton Ogburn of the New York bar, former General
Counsel of the American Federation of Labor, will discuss Labor Law.
The lectures on Wills and Trusts will be given by Professor Lewis M.
Simes, Adviser on the American Law Institute Restatement on Property
and author of a widely recognized treatise on the Law of Future Interests.
Present plans are to have sessions on each of the three days on each
subject, starting at eight-thirty in the morning and running through until
three-thirty in the afternoon, with an intermission of an hour for
lunch, leaving a period free in the afternoon for golf and other relaxation. Mimeographed outlines on each of the subjects will be furnished
in advance to those who register and there will be an opportunity fot
questions and discussion following each lecture.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
The following is an exact copy of a contract (with names and
places fictitious of course) prepared by a layman Justice of the Peace
"Negatee, Michigan,
in Michigan.
This instrument, made and entered into on December 27, 1933,
that being the 27th day of December, between Mitti Mitton, of Negatee,
and Lendi Mitton, of the same place, his wife, both of Negatee, Michigan. Witness: That
in consideration of the reunion and relations
and
cohabitation together of the parties hereto on this day at my office, that
the said Mitti Mitton does hereby promise and agree to and with and
between the said Lendi Mitton, that he will not go to more public
dances except in company with his wife and other women, and that
he will not work at the City of Istaca, that he will not go in company
with Betty and Lucy, nor with any other women of good character,
and that he will from this date on be for the said Lendi Mitton a true
and lawful husband, and that she will be a free woman to go alone to
Brookton on Saturday night, her heirs and assigns, forever.
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In testimony whereof, parties have first put up their hands and
laid their seals in duplicate on the day above written.
Mitti Mitton
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of December,
1933.
Lendi Mitton
William Shup
Justice of the Peace.
and yet some still criticize the drive on unauthorized practice.-Michigan
Bar Journal.
RECENT LABOR BOARD DECISIONS
(1) Distributing a bulletin prepared by the National Association
of Manufacturers which emphasizes what the Act does not do, rather
than its positive principles, is a violation of Sec. 8 (5) of the Act
(Auburn Foundry).
(2)
An employer may.not negotiate with individual employees where a union represents a majority and has requested
a conference for collective bargaining (M. H. Ritzwoller Co.). (3)
A
closed shop contract will be disregarded and an election ordered where
an opposing union claimed to represent a majority of employees prior to
execution of the contract. (Florence Pipe Foundry Z4 Machine.) (Prentice Hall, Inc., November 13, 1939.)
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